Afghanistan has been the graveyard of empires ever since Alexander the Great

Earlier this month Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned that time is running out in Afghanistan. Though emphasizing the need for reconstruction and noting that "we cannot kill our way to victory," he also announced that a new strategy would have to be pursued that would essentially consist of sending more soldiers, drawing them down from Iraq and sending them to Afghanistan.

Both Barack Obama and John McCain have endorsed sending two more combat brigades to Afghanistan, less than the three that the Pentagon is seeking. The strategy for victory assumes, of course, that more soldiers alone will remedy what ails Afghanistan, turning the country around and making it into a stable, pluralistic democracy. No one questions that security is a fundamental issue if Afghanistan is to be stabilized, but the assumption that 10,000 more soldiers will make the crucial difference can and should be questioned by the American public, which is providing the soldiers and paying the costs of the war.

Reading history books may not be required at the Naval Academy, but Adm. Mullen should consider some historical analogies. Afghanistan has been the graveyard of empires ever since Alexander the Great had trouble crossing the Khyber Pass in 326 B.C. He wisely decided to pretty much leave the tribesmen alone and moved south to India. From the Middle Ages on, waves of invading Mongols, Moghul rulers of India, and Persians have swept through the area, but the Afghan tribes have always proved fractious and hard to rule. More