US Chopper Losses

After a spike in helicopter losses in Iraq last year (seven in one month), losses have been sharply reduced. This was due to several factors. First, there was one group of Iraq terrorists freedom fighters who were using heavy machine-guns, and predictable flying patterns by some American pilots, to stage ambushes last year.

Then there was the beginning of the surge offensive, which put helicopters into the air more often, and less predictably. The Iraqi ambush gang was caught and destroyed, and helicopter pilots changed their tactics (they now fly higher, on random flight paths, and in twos instead of larger groups.) Another important factor is pilot experience. More of the pilots in the air now, have been to Iraqi before. Experience counts. Finally, the surge offensive of 2007 put most of the opposition out of business (either because they were killed or captured, or because they changed sides.)

The most dangerous anti-aircraft weapon has always been the machine-gun. However, aircraft losses to ground fire have been declining every year, since 2003, mainly because of good defensive tactics. The losses in early 2007 were largely the result of getting sloppy.

Although the most vulnerable aircraft, helicopters, have been spending more time in the air. In 2005, U.S. Army aircraft (mainly helicopters) flew 240,000 hours over Iraq. That increased to 334,000 hours last year, and went over 400,000 hours in 2007. The more time helicopters are in the air, the more opportunities someone has to shoot at them. More